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PARODY AS FREE SPEECH­

THE REPLACEMENT OF 

THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 

BY FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION* 

difficile est saturam non scribere 
Juvenal 
CHARLES C. GOETSCH** 
From time to time courts are confronted with conflicts be­
tween the rights of parodists and the rights of copyright holders. 
Parody-infringement problems arise when the copyright holder of a 
parodied work charges the parodist with infringement on the 
grounds of copying or substantial appropriation of the work. 1 The 
root of the problem can be traced to the unique characteristics of 
parody. Parody is a distinct literary form that achieves its ends by 
imitating the expression and ideas of serious works in a satiric man­
ner. In order to develop an effective parody, the parodist must 
copy or appropriate various elements of the serious work. Conflicts 
arise when the parodist and the copyright holder disagree as to 
whether such copying exceeds the allowable "fair use" of the origi­
nal work. 2 
There are no statutory provisions, old or new, which address 
the parody-infringement problem. Resolution of the conflict has 
been left to the courts, and their rulings, cast almost exclusively in 
the context of the fair use doctrine, have been inconsistent. The 
* An earlier version of this article was awarded First Prize in the American Soci­
ety of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) 1976 Nathan Burkan Memorial 
Competition at the University of Connecticut School of Law. 
** A.B., Brown University; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; 
LL.M., Harvard Law School. American Bar Foundation Fellow in Legal History and 
Visiting Scholar, Yale Law. School, 1978-79. Law Clerk to Judge Leonard P. Moore, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
1. The substantial appropriation doctrine, which is a corollary to fair use, holds 
that there is no copyright infringement unless the unauthorized taking constitutes a 
substantial amount of the original. See note 27 infra and accompanying text. 
2. The fair use statute allows copying from a copyrighted work as long as the 
appropriation is reasonably expected and not harmful to the rights of the copyright 
owner. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). See notes 23-26 infra and ac­
companying text. 
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results have muddled the relationship between parody and copy­
right and have placed the parodist in doubt as to the legal conse­
quences of publishing his creations. This article suggests a more 
satisfactory approach for courts to use in order to resolve the 
recurring conflict between parody and copyright. The approach is 
based on a distinction between legal parody, which would not be 
subject to copyright law, and nonlegal parody, which would be 
subject to copyright sanctions. This will be done by establishing 
the definition and scope of legal parody and then by demonstrating 
that legal parody is a form of free speech that should be removed 
from the restrictive control of the copyright laws and placed under 
the protection of the first amendment. 
I. PARODY IN PERSPECTIVE 
A few general observations on the means and ends of parody 
will serve to distinguish it from other literary forms. A parody is 
basically a criticism of the ideas and expression of another work. 
The essence of a parody is its comic or satiric contrast to the seri­
ous work. A parodist must copy and appropriate material from the 
serious work in order to establish the identity of the other work, to 
recall its characteristics, and to produce satiric effects which are of­
ten created by the ludicrous juxtaposition of serious and comic ma­
terial. In order to create a contrasting work that conveys his criti­
cism, the parodist must imitate the material of the serious work in 
an exaggerated, distorted, or perverted manner rather than merely 
copy it. Of necessity, then, the intent, expression, and effect of a 
parody are recognizably different from that of the other work. 
Parody is one of the oldest forms of literary expression. The 
originator of the genre is generally regarded to be Hipponax of 
Ephesus, who wrote verse parodies circa 530 B.C.3 Aristophanes 
and Lucian are two of the better known practitioners of parody in 
classical times,4 and the popularity of parody has continued 
undiminished to the present day. One of the greatest works in all 
literature, Cervantes' Don Quixote, began as a parody of the 
3. The parody epic Margites, however, was generally attributed to Homer in 
antiquity, and was mentioned by Archilochus in the 8th century B.C. THE OXFORD 
CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 783 (1970). For a brief historical discussion of parody, see 
Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130, 
1133-37 (1955); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 600-02 (1965). See gener­
ally G. KITCHIN, SURVEY OF BURLESQUES AND PARODY IN ENGLISH (1931). 
4. See, e.g., Aristophanes's play, The Frogs, first performed in 405 B.C.; 
Lucian's parodies, written circa 150 A.D., may be found in P. TURNER, LUCIAN: 
SATIRICAL SKETCHES (1961). 
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Spanish novel of chivalry. Paul Scarron's works are perhaps the 
most notable product of the long tradition of parody in French lit­
erature dating from the eleventh century.5 Parody has had a con­
stant presence in English literature as well, with such authors as 
Chaucer, Shakespeare, Swift, Pope, and Fielding writing tran­
scendent and enduring parodies. 6 Parody has played a lively role in 
American literature due to the comic genius of such authors as 
Mark Twain, James Thurber, and S.J. Perelman. 7 
From this quick historical sketch, the ubiquity of parody in 
the literature of the Western world is apparent. Indeed, it is safe 
to say that where there is literature, there is parody. The reason 
for the universal appeal of parody is twofold: Its high potential as a 
form of entertainment and its high potential as a vehicle for social 
and literary criticism. The ideal parody employs laughter to deliver 
its message. It merges entertainment with instruction, simultane­
ously amusing and enlightening its audience. Concomitant with the 
parodist's desire to entertain and instruct goes his hunger for mate­
rial gain and artistic recognition. His motivation to write is a meld 
of these four elements. Naturally, the emphasis placed on each of 
the four elements varies considerably from work to work and au­
thor to author. Any attempt to divorce one from the others is both 
unrealistic and misleading. 
Regardless of how individual parodists may differ on their em­
phasis of these four motivating elements, literary scholars agree 
that parody as a genre fulfills an extremely important function. 8 By 
5. See, e.g., Scarron's Virgile Travestie (1648-52). See generally V. GRANNIS, 
DRAMATIC PARODY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 11-12 (1931). 
6. See, e.g., The Rhyme of Sir Thopas and The Nun's Priest's Tale in Chaucer's 
CANTERBURY TALES (1386-1400), Bottom's play of Pyramus and Thisbe in Shake­
speare's Midsummer Night's Dream Act V, scene one (circa 1594), and Swift's 
GULUVER'S TRAVELS (1726). One of the classic works of English literature, 
Alexander Pope's The Rape of the Lock (1712), is cast as a parody of the epic; addi­
tionally, Henry Fielding's novels, SHAMELA (1741) and JOSEPH ANDREWS (1742), 
which parodied the feminine novels of Samuel Richardson, are considered a major 
source of the modem novel. See generally G. KITCHIN, supra note 3; D. MAC­
DONALD, PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY (1960). 
7. See, e.g., C. NEIDER, THE COMPLETE HUMOROUS SKETCHES AND TALES 
OF MARK TWAIN (1961); C. NEIDER, THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF MARK 
TWAIN (1957); S.J. PERELMAN, THE MOST OF S.J. PERELMAN (1958); J. THURBER, THE 
THURBER CARNIVAL (1964). See generally R. FALK, AMERICAN LITERATURE IN 
PARODY (1955); B. LOWREY, TWENTIETH CENTURY PARODY, AMERICAN AND BRIT­
ISH (1960). 
8. [Allthough parody is a parasitic art and written at times with malice, it is 
as fundamental to literature as laughter is to health.... The best parody sur­
passes mere imitation. It stands on its own feet, containing enough inde­
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the vigorous criticism of serious works, by exposing the mediocre 
and the pretentious, and by calling attention to the decay of liter­
ary mannerisms and techniques, parody influences the develop­
ment of a society's literature. To the extent that literature is a re­
flection of society, parody is a commentary on society. Throughout 
history, Western civilization has acknowledged this vital role of 
parody by recognizing it as an independent form of literature. 
Clearly, a literary genre that has consistently appealed to authors 
and audiences down through the ages and that has inspired such 
classics as Don Quixote, Gulliver's Travels, The Rape of the Lock, 
and Joseph Andrews has great potential and should be accorded 
substantial encouragement and protection. 9 
II. LEGAL PARODY 
Much of the confusion surrounding the law's treatment of 
parody has resulted from the use of a far too general and inexact 
definition of parody by the courts and legal scholars. By relying on 
the loose interpretation of broad dictionary definitions,10 courts at 
times have mistakenly classified disputed works as parodies and 
then have proceeded to apply the fair use doctrine to them. As will 
pendent humor to be funny beyond aping the original. . . . There are as 
many different motives for parody as there are parodists. Sometimes ... it is 
personal spite. More often, the parodist employs the style of the original to 
poke fun at current follies or vices. He might have a social axe to grind or he 
might wish to expose a certain literary school or mannerism which has hard­
ened into conventionality.... With a history of 25 centuries behind it, 
parody is here to stay. Like all literature, it has had its ups and downs, but 
at its best it is more than a parasitic art. It has attracted men and women of 
major stature and at times has shown the capacity to outlive the serious work 
which has inspired it. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 600-02 (1965). Legal scholars have also rec­
ognized the value of parody. "Throughout history, parody has been a vital and 
recognized part of literature. Many important works of art are parodies of long­
forgotten originals. Historically, it is clear that parody qualifies as an independent art 
form." Nimmer, Reflections on the Problem of Parody-Infringement, 17 ASCAP 
COPYRIGHT L: SYMP. 133, 152 (1969). M.B. Nimmer speaks of parody as a "socially 
useful literary genre" providing important benefits to society. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[cJ (1979). 
9. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 
(S.D.N.Y.), afI'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). 
10. Webster's, for instance, defines parody as: 
(a) a writing in which the language and style of an author or work is closely 
imitated for comic effect or in ridicule often with certain peculiarities 
greatly heightened or exaggerated; (b) a literary style characterized by the 
reproduction of stylistic peculiarities of an author or works for comic effect 
or in ridicule. 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1969). 
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be seen, the result has been an unfortunate one for the opposing 
parties and for parody as a whole. 11 Establishing the definition and 
scope of legal parody is the first step toward clarifying the proper 
relationship between parody and the law. 
A legal parody may be defined as any work which imitates in a 
satiric manner the ideas and expression of an identifiable previ­
ously published work. A legal parody may exist in the form of a 
novel, story, poem, musical composition, dramatization, film, or 
visual caricature. It is not a mere copy of the serious work, nor a 
mere impersonation or mimicry of any character or person. 12 It is 
not a general humorous commentary concerning people, events, or 
things. For a parodist to have produced a legal parody, it must be 
clear that he took an identifiable previously published work and, 
through the creative use of satiric imitation and invention, meta­
morphized the work's ideas and expression into a recogniz­
ably distinct work. Any disputed work which satisfies this standard, 
whether or not it arguably contains substantial appropriation or 
copying under the fair use doctrine, 13 is a legal parody and, as will 
be seen,14 is entitled to protection as free speech under the first 
amendment. 15 Parodies which satirize entire genres or literary 
techniques,16 rather than a specific previously published work, also 
11. See notes 30-47 infra and accompanying text. 
12. "As a true burlesque is not an imitation but a criticism of an original work, 
ordinarily it cannot be an imitation of or be 'passed off' as the original work." 
Yankwich, supra note 3, at 1154. 
13. For the definition of fair use and substantial appropriation, see notes 1 & 2 
supra; notes 23-28 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See notes 83-111 infra and accompanying text. 
15. A footnote in a recent Second Circuit per curiam opinion indicates that vir­
tually the same result may be achieved by an expansive application of the fair use 
test: 
[We] note that the concept of "conjuring up" an original came into the copy­
right law not as a limitation on how much of an original may be used, but as 
a recognition that a parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evo­
cation of an original in order to make its humorous point. A parody is enti­
tled at least to "conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use would 
still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, using the 
original as a known element of modern culture and contributing something 
new for humorous effect or commentary. 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 
623 F.2d 252 n.l (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the tangled history 
of parody and copyright law demonstrates that the application of the fair use test 
should be 'avoided in favor of a more consistent and objective approach. See 
discussion of fair use's inapplicability to parody at notes 48-82 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
16. See, e.g., Chaucer's The Rhyme of Sir Thopas, supra note 6 and Cervantes' 
DON QUIXOTE (1615). 
\ 
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qualify as legal parodies. Any disputed work which fails to meet 
the standard of legal parody may be classified as nonlegal parody 
and subjected to the scrutiny of the copyright laws. 17 
A few courts and scholars have drawn a distinction between 
"true" and "commercial" parody, arguing that parodies written 
more for financial considerations than for artistic reasons do not 
merit preferred treatment. 1S This distinction is pointless because it 
ignores the basic nature of literature and the actual practice of au­
thors. It is obvious that the vast majority of authors combine both 
commercial and artistic motives in all their works. An author natu­
rally wants to support himself and to convey his message, and to 
accomplish both it is in his interest to sell as many copies or tickets 
as possible. Who, then, can fairly condemn one work as commer­
cial and laud another as true when both motives go hand in 
glove?19 The great Samuel Johnson remarked that "No man but a 
blockhead ever wrote, except for money."20 It was only the pros­
pect of ameliorating his oppressive poverty that prompted 
Cervantes to begin writing Don Quixote. 21 Henry Fielding wrote 
Shamela and Joseph Andrews in a desperate attempt to support his 
family after the Licensing Act of 1737 cut off his income by closing 
down his theatre. 22 Neither Cervantes nor Fielding would have 
denied that a major factor in his motivation to write was the com­
mercial potential of his novels. By using the commercial versus 
true ploy, it would have been all too easy to rationalize the en­
joining of Cervantes's or Fielding's parodies. The concept of legal 
parody recognizes that the financial motive and the artistic intent 
17. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); M. NIMMER, 
supra note 8. 
18. See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 
(S.D. Cal. 1955), afI'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afI'd 
sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); and 
Nimmer, supra note 8. 
19. In the words of one scholar, "The trouble with this commercial-non­
commercial distinction is that both commercial and artistic elements are involved 
in almost every use." Rossett,. Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, 9 ASCAP COpy­
RIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 18 (1958). See also Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of 
Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 2~8 (1962); 
Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 596-97 (1956). . 
20. J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 731 (1970). 
21. "And it was, no doubt, the need of money that led [Cervantes] to undertake 
the composition of a tale destined to become one of the world's greatest fictional 
masterpieces." S. PUTNAM, THE PORTABLE CERVANTES 2 (1971). 
22. See 1 W. CROSS, THE HISTORY OF HENRY FIELDING, 205-37, 282-359 
(1918). 
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of the parodist cannot be fairly separated, and thus the degree of 
the parodist's commercial motivation is immaterial. 
For a parodist to have written a legal parody, then, it must be 
clear that he took the ideas and expression of a previously pub­
lished work and, through the creative use of satiric imitation and 
invention, metamorphized them into a recognizably distinct work. 
If a disputed work satisfies this standard, it is a legal parody. Legal 
parody, as will be shown, should be entitled to first amendment 
protection whether or not its appropriation or copying violates fair 
use. The commercial motivation of the parodist is irrelevant to a 
determination of whether a work is a legal parody. Mere copying, 
impersonation, or humorous commentary is nonlegal parody. Paro­
dies of genres or literary techniques, however, may qualifY as legal 
parody. 
III. FAIR USE AND PARODY 
Fair use is a doctrine that allows copying from a copyrighted 
work so long as the appropriation is reasonably expected and not 
harmful to the rights of the copyright owner. Fair use has been de­
fined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use 
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his con­
sent .... [It is] technically an infringement of copyright, but is 
allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable 
and customary. "23 The Copyright Act of 1976 merely restates the 
definition of fair use fashioned by the courts over the years without 
narrowing or enlarging the four elements of commercial use, na­
ture of work, amount copied, and market effect.24 Uses of a copy­
righted work for the customary purposes of criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research are specifically 
23. H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). In the 
words of one judge, "The doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually 
to defy definition." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(No. 4901); Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1954). 
24. Section 107 of the new Act reads: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include­
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
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excluded from the Act's fair use section. 25 Whether or not copying 
in a parody goes beyond the boundaries of fair use is a pragmatic 
question to be determined by the courts after taking into consider­
ation the circumstances of each case. 26 The concept of substantial 
appropriation is essentially a corollary branch of the fair use doc­
trine. Under the substantial appropriation doctrine, there is no in.,. 
fringement unless the copying or taking constitutes what the court 
finds to be a substantial amount of the original. 27 
Since the early twentieth century, when courts first began to 
speak of parody exclusively in the terms of fair use,28 judges at­
tempting to resolve parody-infringement conflicts have applied the 
fair use and substantial appropriation doctrines in order to deter­
mine whether the copying in a particular parody indeed consti­
tuted an infringement. As the following discussion indicates, the 
results of these cases have been inconsistent and generally unsatis­
factory for two reasons: The courts either failed to apply a proper 
definition of parody and thus mistakenly treated some disputed 
works as parodies, or they failed to recognize that the fair use and 
substantial appropriation doctrines should not be applicable to valid 
legal parodies. 
The slim body of American cases dealing with the conflict be­
tween parody and copyright can be divided into two classes: Those 
concerned with nonlegal parody and those concerned with legal 
parody.29 The nonlegal parody cases deal with disputed works 
which cannot properly be considered parodies at all, and they 
illustrate the confusion caused by an over-inclusive definition of 
parody. The legal parody cases illustrate why the application of the 
fair use test to actual parodies is unsatisfactory and inappropriate. 
A. The Nonlegal Parody Cases 
The first three nonlegal parody cases, Bloom & Hamlin v. 
Nixon,3o Green v. Minzensheimer,31 and Green v. Luby,32 all arose 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
26. See, e.g., Carr v. National Capital Press, Inc., 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934); 
Yankwich, supra note 23, at 205, 213-14. 
27. See H. Ball, supra note 23, at 334; Nimmer, supra note 8, at 136-37. 
28. See notes 30-39 infra and accompanying text. 
29. The few English cases dealing with the parody-infringement problem are of 
little relevance here. They do establish, however, that visual caricatures or rough 
sketches of a whole work and parodies of incidents in a novel or of scenes from a 
.play are both forms of fair use which do not constitute copyright infringement. For 
an excellent discussion of the English cases, see Yankwich, supra note 3, at 1137-45. 
30. 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903). 
31. 177 F. 286 (C.C.N.Y. 1909). 
32. 177 F. 287 (C.C.N.Y. 1909). 
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in the early 1900's from the singing of copyrighted songs by profes­
sional mimics imitating the style of a particular performer. In 
Nixon, the district court found no infringement since the mimic did 
not actually perform the song but merely used a portion of it as a 
vehicle for the imitation. The court did not classify the perfor­
mance as parody, but rather emphasized that it was mimicry.33 
Similarly, in Minzensheimer, the circuit judge held that the de­
fendant's rendition of only a part of a copyrighted song while imi­
tating a popular actress was not an infringement since the song 
was merely a vehicle for the mimicry.34 Luby also concerned a 
professional mimic singing a copyrighted song while imitating the 
mannerisms of a well-known performer, except that the defendant 
sang the whole song verbatim. The circuit judge held there was an 
infringement because the defendant could have found a way to 
mimic the popular singer without performing a complete copy­
righted song. 35 
These three cases have been identified by courts and legal 
scholars as the beginning of American case law on the parody­
infringement problem, and are usually cited as precedent for the 
rule that a parody using an entire work constitutes an infringe­
ment. 36 Condemning parodies solely because they reproduce en­
tire works is an example of the mischief caused by an exceedingly 
broad definition of parody. In no way can the disputed perfor­
mance in any of these cases be considered even a dictionary­
definition parody, much less a legal parody. In a 1964 parody­
33. 125 F. at 977. Nixon involved an actress with unusual powers of mimicry 
who imitated the peculiarities and characteristics of another actress singing the 
chorus to the song "Sammy." The performance was preceded by an announcement 
identifying the actress and song imitated. The· actress only sang a few lines of the 
original, and concentrated on mimicking the well known actions, gestures, and tones 
of the other actress. 
34. 177 F. at 286. Minzensheimer involved an actress who imitated the voice, 
posture, and mannerisms of the plaintiff popular singer singing one verse and the 
chorus of the song "Redhead." The actress sang without any musical accompani­
ment, and prefaced her performance by announcing she would give "a suggestion" 
of the popular singer. 
35. 177 F. at 287. Luby involved an actress who imitated the plaintiff popular 
singer by singing the song ''I'm A Bringing Up The Family" in its entirety. The ac­
tress contended that her goal was impersonation, and thus she mimicked the 
plaintiff's mannerisms as closely as possible while singing the complete song to mu­
sical accompaniment. 
36. See, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 
(S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afI'd 
sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); 
Yankwich, supra note 23, at 207 n.20. See also Savage v. Hoffman, 159 F. 584 
(S.D.N.Y. 1908). 
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infringement case, Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pointed out that Nixon, 
Minzensheimer, and Luby "did not deal with the parody of a copy­
righted work, but with imitations of a particular artist's style of per­
forming, in which portions of a copyrighted song were incidentally 
employed. "37 Mere impersonation is not parody. There was no at­
tempt to create a distinct work which criticized the original. On 
the contrary, the defendants tried to reproduce the words and style 
of the plaintiffs as closely as possible. To divine the presence of 
parody in these three cases is to grossly misinterpret their facts and 
holdings. As precedent, they relate more to misappropriation of 
characters and substantial appropriation than to parody. 
The next case after Luby that purported to address the 
parody-infringement problem, Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 38 
arose in 1914 and illustrates the confusion which continued to sur­
round the law's treatment of parody. The defendant was charged 
with reproducing the cartoon characters "Mutt" and "Jeff" in a dra­
matic performance. The performance contained two personages 
named "Nutt" and "Giff" whose costumes, manner, and catch­
words were identical to those of the familiar original cartoon char­
acters. The defendant claimed that his representation was a parody 
and thus was allowable in spite of direct quotations from, and im­
personation of, the original characters. The district court, however, 
held there was an infringement. Hill exemplifies a disputed work 
which claims to be a parody when in fact it does not satisfY the re­
quirements of a parody at all. In the words of Circuit Court Judge 
Kaufman, in Hill "the defense of 'parody' or 'burlesque' was clearly 
invoked in bad faith, as an attempt to justifY a taking designed sub­
stantially to satisfY the demand for the copyrighted original. "39 The 
performance related more to misappropriation of characters and 
substantial appropriation than to parody; clearly it was open to at­
tack under the fair use test, but not in the capacity of a parody. Al­
though the court did not actually classify the performance as 
parody, neither did it explicitly reject the defendant's improper 
claim for protection. As in the first three cases, the court failed to 
recognize the differences between the disputed work and valid 
parody. 
37. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 822 (1964) . 
. 38. 220 F. 359 (D.C.N.Y. 1914). 
39. 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). 
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Two United States district court cases brought in the early 
1970's, Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates40 and Walt Disney 
Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., 41 indicate that defendants' 
misconception of the scope and definition of parody still leads 
them to pursue parody unsuccessfully as a defense to infringement 
claims. In both cases the defendants claimed protection for their 
works on the ground that they were parodies. In both instances the 
court held the works to be infringements. That the disputed work 
was not a parody was most obvious in the Mature Pictures case. 
There, in the defendant's movie "The Life and Times of the Happy 
Hooker," the plaintiff's copyrighted song "The Mickey Mouse 
March" was sung and played as background music while an actress 
and three actors engaged in a variety of sexual activities. The court 
pointed out that a parody is not defined as a complete copy of the 
original and unhesitatingly granted an injunction with the comment 
that the defendants "did not parody the Mickey Mouse March but 
sought only to improperly use the copyrighted material. "42 In Air 
Pirates, Walt Disney Productions sought an injunction against the 
publication of comic book magazines in which the defendant repro­
duced Disney's well-known cartoon characters Mickey Mouse and 
his friends. The names and graphic depiction of the characters in 
the defendant's works were exactly the same as Disney's. The de­
fendant argued, however, that he conveyed a message significantly 
different from that of Disney through the use of markedly differ­
ent themes and plots. He thus claimed fair use protection on 
the ground that the disputed works were parodies. 43 The court 
granted an injunction after determining that the defendant's 
copying was substantial appropriation. 44 The court expressly de­
clined to decide whether the disputed works were in fact parodies. 
It did indicate, however, that some doubt existed by noting "What­
40. 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afI'd in parl and rev'd in parl, 581 F.2d 
751 (9th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). 
41. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
42. Id. at 1398. See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 453-54 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the copyright holder of the song "The Boogie Woogie Bu­
gle Boy" sued the defendant musicians for copyright infringement. The defendants 
argued that their version of the song was not intended to be a parody of "Bugle Boy" 
but was rather designed to burlesque the musical style and sexual mores of the 
1940's. The court held that the defendants' version was largely copied from "Bugle 
Boy," that it was not a parody or burlesque, and that it was not entitled to any fair 
use defense. 
43. 345 F. Supp. at 109. 
44. [d. at 116. 
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ever the affiant may have meant by his use of 'parody' in this con­
text, the Court is able to discern no attempt at caricature of 
plaintiff's drawings of Mickey Mouse. "45 The court later hinted 
that a lesser degree of taking, such as caricature, may have been 
permissible. 46 In concluding, the court held that since the defend­
ant's work was an infringing violation of fair use, he could not 
invoke the protection of the first amendment. 47 
These two cases aptly illustrate how the inexact legal definition 
of parody results in the misuse of the parody defense by infringing 
defendants. Both courts were correct in refusing to extend any pro­
tection to the disputed works because they clearly did not qualify 
as parodies. In Mature Pictures, there was simply a blatant case of 
the unlicensed reproduction of a copyrighted song. In Air Pirates, 
the court decided against the defendants because exact copies of the 
characters were used rather than caricatures. In essence, there was 
reproduction rather than satiric imitation. The defendant in Mature 
Pictures could have raised the disputed performance to the level of 
parody by using satiric invention to transpose the lyrics and music 
of "The Mickey Mouse March" into a recognizably different work. 
Similarly, the defendants in Air Pirates could have parodied Walt 
Disney's cartoon characters by exaggerating their graphic depiction 
to the point of caricature. In other words, there were alternative 
avenues available to the defendants in these two cases that would 
have allowed them to convey their message through legitimate 
parody rather than mere reproduction. By refusing to further dis­
tort the scope of parody, these two nonlegal parody cases help 
clarify the relationship between parody and the law. 
B. The Legal Parody Cases 
There are three cases which deal with the question of whether 
a legal parody infringes copyright: Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broad­
casting System, Inc., 48 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National 
45. Id. at 110 n.l. 
46. It need not be determined whether parody would, in fact, be possible, by 
taking less, for example by caricaturing the plaintiff's characters, or whether 
some degree of such lesser taking would be permissible. The Court is in no po­
sition to dictate a mode of literary expression to the defendants, nor to decide 
cases not before it. 
Id. at 115. 
47. [d. at 116. See notes 83-111 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the relationship between parody and the first amendment. See also Comment, 
Parody, Copyrights, and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564 (1976). 
48. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), afI'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, 239 
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Broadcasting Co., 49 both of which emanated from the Southern 
District of California in the mid-1950's, and Berlin v. E.C. Publica­
tions, Inc., 50 which arose in the Southern District of New York in 
the early 1960's. Of these, Loew's is the most glaring example of 
why the fair use test is so inapplicable to legal parody. In Loew's, 
the plaintiff movie company sought to enjoin comedian Jack Benny 
and his television network from broadcasting a full length parody 
of the plaintiff's copyrighted movie "Gaslight. "51 The district court 
granted the injunction after finding that Benny's parody constituted 
a substantial taking. 52 The court emphasized a number of factors in 
order to reach this result, the foremost of which was Benny's finan­
cial motivation. Referring to the active competition between the 
television and motion picture industries, the court concluded that 
Benny's taking from the copyrighted work was predominantly for 
commercial gain and thus presumptively not a fair use. 53 The court 
also found that, in light of the strong profit motive behind Benny's 
parody, it could not be considered a work of criticism entitled to 
protection under the fair use doctrine. 54 Finally, the court relied 
on the early nonlegal parody cases as support for its holding that 
"a parodized or burlesqued taking is treated no differently from 
any other appropriation. "55 
The reasoning and result of the Loew's decision has drawn 
wide and sustained criticism. 56 Scholars have criticized the court 
for treating parody no differently than other forms of appropriation, 
for its stress upon the commercial motivations of the parodist, and 
for its chilling effect on the publication of parody. Justice Benjamin 
Kaplan of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, after arguing 
that the right to parody a work without permission of the copyright 
holder is as clear as the right to reproduce excerpts of a work for 
the purposes of criticism, stated, "I will not conceal my view that it 
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afI'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, 
Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
49. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). 

SO. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). 

51. 131 F. Supp. at 167. 
52. Id. at 186. 
53. Id. at 174-76. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 177, 183. 
56. See, e.g., Netterville, supra note 19; Yankwich, supra note 3; Comment, 
Parody and the Law of Copyright, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 570 (1961); Note, supra 
note 19; Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright Infringement?, 12 
VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959). But see Selvin, Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted 
Works as Infringement, 6 COPYRIGHT Soc. BULL. 53 (1958). 
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was wrong-and possibly unconstitutional-to hold Jack Benny for 
his television parody of the movie 'Gaslight.' "57 
Another distinguished copyright scholar, Judge Leon R. 
Yankwich of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California, wrote that the Loew's opinion stressed un­
duly the fact that Benny's burlesque was used as a means of gain. 58 
He disputed Loew's assertion that parody should be judged in the 
same manner as serious takings. 59 As for the chilling effect of 
Loew's, Professor Victor S. Netterville pointed out that the deci­
sion "may materially restrict an important and socially desirable 
form of speech . . . . Taken very literally, the decision . . . may 
well deprive [the parodist] of the most important and potent source 
material--<:ontemporary art, literature, music and motion picture 
materials."60 The unfortunate ramifications of Loew's can be traced 
back to the court's misperception of parody's role in society and to 
its misguided application of the fair use test to what was, in fact, a 
legal parody. An application of the legal parody concept to the facts 
of Loew's reveals how useful it can be in untangling the confusion 
that has historically surrounded the law's treatment of parody. 
A legal parody is a distinct work that imitates in a satiric man­
ner the ideas and expression of a previously published work. A par­
odist is deemed to have written a legal parody if it is clear that he 
took the previously published work and, through the creative use 
of satiric imitation and invention, transposed its ideas and expres­
sion into a recognizably distinct work. When that standard is ap­
plied to the Loew's court's own findings offact,61 it becomes evident 
that Benny's parody of "Gaslight" was indeed a legal parody. The 
court stated that the characters were generally the same, the story 
points practically identical, the treatment almost identical, except 
that the defendant's treatment was burlesque, and that there was 
borrowing of much dialogue with some variations in wording. 62 
These findings describe subtle yet crucial differences between 
Benny's parody and the serious work. The court's subsequent 
discussion of the differences between the two works provides fur­
ther indication that Benny's work was a legal ~arody: 
57. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967). See notes 83­
III infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment rights of the 
parodist. 
58. Yankwich, supra note 3, at 1151. 
59. [d. at 1151-52. 
60. Netterville, supra note 19, at 237 (emphasis in original). 
61. 131 F. Supp. at 171. 
62. [d. 
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The serious, near tragic vein of the original "Gaslight" was 
converted into the broad, low comic vein of the burlesque. 
Benny, using gags, puns, exaggerated mimicry, slapstick and dis­
tortion, all matters. within the common fund of the public do­
main, has taken a substantial part of plaintifFs property, "Gas­
light," and inverted the mood from serious to humorous. 
Tragedy and comedy, like love and hate are but opposite faces of 
the same coin. Defendants have transposed the work, from the 
serious to the comic vein. 63 
The court's description reveals that Benny, through the creative 
use of satiric imitation and invention, took the ideas and expression 
of "Gaslight" and produced a parody that was recognizably distinct 
from the original work. 
An application of the legal parody concept to Loew's would 
have avoided the unfortunate ramifications and confusions of the 
actual decision. Since the court would have classified Benny's 
parody as a legal one, the existence of an arguably substantial ap­
propriation would have been irrelevant and the court's analytical 
task much simpler. Classifying Benny's work as a legal parody 
would also have rendered the degree of his commercial motivation 
irrelevant, and would have prevented the court from improperly 
divorcing the parodist's commercial motivation from his artistic mo­
tivation. Treating Benny's version of "Gaslight" as legal parody 
would be in accord with the feelings of Justice Kaplan, who has 
pointed out that "we must accept the harsh truth that parody may 
quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it com­
mercially as well as artistically,"64 and with Judge Yankwich, who 
has stressed that a parodist's receipt of abundant remuneration 
should not obscure the fact that the primary consideration of Eng­
lish and American copyright law is to advance the progress of arts 
and sciences. In giving effect to that objective, material gain is sec­
ondary.65 The application of the legal parody concept would insure 
that immaterial factors, such as the parodist's commercial motiva­
tion and the intensity of competition between the parties, would 
have no effect on the determination of whether a parody infringes a 
copyright. 
The application of the legal parody concept also would have 
avoided the Loew's court's inexplicable conclusion that all parodies 
should be judged in the same manner as serious takings. Since 
63. Id. at 183 (emphasis in original). 
64. B. KAPLAN, supra note 57, at 69. 
65. Yankwich, supra note 3, at 1151. 
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parody, by its very nature, entails considerable amounts of copying 
and appropriation, under the Loew's theory parodies would almost 
always constitute impermissible infringements. 66 Such a theory not 
only ignores the status of parody as a distinct literary genre that 
has been in existence since the beginning of Western literature, 
but it also has a chilling effect on the creation and publication of 
parody. The legal parody concept, on the other hand, respects the 
value of parody as entertainment and criticism. It encourages the 
publication of legitimate parodies by protecting them from the in­
appropriate censorship of the copyright laws. Had Jack Benny's 
parody been classified as a legal parody, it would have been re­
moved from the restrictive control of the fair use doctrine and 
placed under the protection of the first amendment, thus up­
holding the role of parody in society and simplifYing the work of 
the court. 
It is evident from this brief discussion that an application of 
the legal parody concept to Loew's would have avoided the unfor­
tunate rationale of that case. Loew's illustrates that the fair use doc­
trine is incapable of consistently resolving the legal problems 
arising when parody contains substantial appropriation from a seri­
ous work. Precisely how and why the legal parody concept is capa­
ble of resolving this problem will be discussed after an examination 
of the other two cases involving legal parodies. 
Although the second legal parody opinion, Columbia Pictures 
Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 67 arose in the same context as 
Loew's and was written by the same district court judge, its hold­
ing was in favor of the defendant television parodist. Columbia Pic­
tures concerned a suit for infringement brought by the plaintiff 
motion picture corporation against the comedian Sid Caesar and his 
television network in response to the broadcast of Caesar's parody 
of the plaintiffs copyrighted movie, "From Here to Eternity." 
After acknowledging that Columbia Pictures was a counterpart to 
Loew's, the court denied the plaintiff relief, pointing out that, un­
like Benny's parody, "here there was a taking of only [enough] to 
cause the viewer to recall and conjure up the original" which is "a 
necessary element of burlesque. "68 The court stated that a parody 
may take the title, theme, settings, situations, characters, ideas, 
basic plots, incidents, and a small amount of the story's develop­
66. Id. at 1151-52. 
67. 137 F. Supp. at 348. 
68. [d. at 351. 
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ment and dialogue from a serious work without infringement. 69 
The court warned, however, that parody is not a defense to in­
fringement per se, adding that if a parody takes more than the 
matter not ordinarily protected it runs the risk of being deemed a 
substantial appropriation. 7o Since the court found Caesar's parody 
to be an original work substantially different from the motion pic­
ture, it held that there was no copyright infringement. 71 
Loew's and Columbia Pictures exemplify the inconsistencies 
and faulty reasoning that inevitably stem from the application of 
the fair use test to parodies. Loew's declared that parody should be 
treated no differently than serious takings,72 yet Columbia Pictures 
declared that the law permits parodies a more extensive use of copy­
righted material than literary works not intended as parodies. 73 
Loew's heavy emphasis on the commercial motivations behind 
Benny's parody is totally absent in Columbia Pictures, yet surely 
the commercial impetus behind Sid Caesar's televised parody was 
at least equal to that of Jack Benny. The district court's applica­
tion of the fair use test in Columbia Pictures led it to conclude that 
parody may make use of a story's incidents, characters, plot, and 
dialogue but not "the general or entire story line and development 
of the original with its expression, points of suspense and build up 
to climax. "74 This is at best a clumsy and arbitrary distinction 
which can only confuse arid unduly restrict the boundaries of 
parody. In applying the fair use test to the legal parodies in Loew's 
and Columbia Pictures, the court reaped nothing but contradictory 
results and artificial distinctions. Given the vague standards of fair 
use and the complex nature and techniques of parody, however, 
this is not surprising. If the Benny and Caesar parodies had been 
classified as legal parodies at the outset, the inconsistent rulings of 
wew's and Columbia Pictures would have been avoided. 
The last legal parody case, Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 75 
involved a claim of copyright infringement against Mad Magazine 
by the copyright owners of various popular songs. The defendant 
humor magazine published what was billed as "a collection of 
parody lyrics to 57 old standards which reflect the idiotic world we 
69. Id. at 350, 353. 
70. Id. at 353. 
71. Id. 
72. 131 F. Supp. at 177, 183. 
73. 137 F. Supp. at 354. 
74. Id. 
75. 329 F.2d at 541. 
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live in today"76 with instructions to sing the parodies to the tunes 
of the plaintiff's well-known popular songs. The parodies were 
written in the same meter as the original lyrics, but there was no 
reproduction of the accompanying music. In a succinct and well­
reasoned 1964 opinion, Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined the na­
ture, purpose, and effect of the parodies and held that, under the 
substantiality test outlined in Loew's, there was clearly no infringe­
ment. Nonetheless, Judge Kaufman embraced the reasoning of 
Loew's with considerable reluctance and in fact obliquely criti­
cized it at several points. He was careful to state that the dis­
parities in theme, content, and style between the original lyrics 
and Mad Magazine's parodies made the disputed works fall short of 
the "substantial" takings in Loew's "even if we were to find the ra­
tionale of that opinion persuasive. "77 He also discounted the signif­
icance of a parodist's commercial motivations by stressing that the 
dominant constitutional objective of copyright is to "promote the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts. "78 Judge Kaufman asserted 
that courts must occasionally subordinate copyright holders' finan­
cial interests to the greater public interest in the development of 
arts and sciences. 79 After rejecting the relevance of the early non­
legal parody cases, he concluded by stating that "as a general prop­
osition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of substan­
tial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and 
literary criticism. "80 With its criticism of Loew's decisional grounds 
and its emphasis on the need to protect parody as a valuable art, 
Berlin goes as far toward disowning Loew's as possible without ex­
pressly doing so. 
It is clear from the nine cases discussed above that the history 
of the application of the fair use test to parody has been an un­
happy one. The fair use test has produced inconsistent results 
when applied to the parody-infringement problem because it can­
76. Id. at 543. 
77. Id. at 545 (emphasis added). See also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Ran­
dom House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 
(1967). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
79. 329 F.2d at 544. 
80. ld. at 545. The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed the importance of pro­
tecting parody: "[We believe] that, in today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, 
copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody." Elsmere Music, Inc. v. 
National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
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not resolve the basic conflict between the right of the parodist to 
publish his work and the right of the copyright holder to bar 
unlicensed copying. In essence, the standards of the fair use test 
are too vague, its application is too discretionary, and its results are 
too erratic to successfully govern a literary form as subtle, complex, 
and changeable as parody. By engendering an inappropriate sub­
stantiality test, by unduly emphasizing commercial motivations, 
and hy disregarding the historic role of parody as entertainment 
and criticism, the fair use test has placed the parodist in doubt as 
to the extent of his right to publish his works and has thus inhib­
ited the free exercise of an ancient and valuable art. The proposals 
that have been advanced by scholars to alter the application of the 
fair use test to parody either have been ignored or were flawed in 
their approach. Judge Yankwich, for example, has merely proposed 
an expanded version of the fair use test,81 while Professor R. T. 
Nimmer has advanced a discretionary fair use test that relies on 
the suspect distinction between' true and commercial parody. 82 
There is an urgent need for a new approach that can resolve 
the conflict between parody and copyright and place parody in its 
proper relationship to the law. The approach that best accom­
plishes this is to treat legal parody as a form of free speech pro­
tected by the first amendment. For this approach to work, it is 
necessary for the courts to adopt the concept of legal parody and to 
accept the premise that, in the case of legal parody, the interests of 
free speech and the promotion of the arts outweigh the interest of 
copyright holders in obtaining maximum financial return from their 
copyrighted works. The crucial questions to answer, then, are how 
and why legal parody should enjoy protection as free speech under 
the first amendment. 
81. In the light of literary history and the purposes of the copyright laws, we 
should extend rather than constrict the boundaries of "fair use." The controlling 
question should be not whether the parody or burlesque contains the skeleton or 
outline of the play or story it criticizes or ridicules, but whether it is true parody 
or a mere subterfuge for appropriating another person's intellectual creation. 
Yankwich, supra note 3, at 1152. Yankwich's proposal had no discernible effect on 
the appellate court considering Loew's, or on a similar case (Paramount Pictures Corp. 
v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 172-57 (S.D. Cal. 1957), or on the Berlin case. See 
also Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), 
afI'd, 623 F.2d 252 n.l (2d Cir. 1980). 
82. R.T. Nimmer's suggested approach relies too heavily on the false distinc­
tion between "true" and "commercial" parody and on an excessively discretionary 
application of the fair use doctrine by the courts. See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 
151-61. See also Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copy­
right, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615 (1979). 
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IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COPYRIGHT, AND PARODY 
There is a paradoxical conflict between the first amendment 
and copyright: the first amendment states that "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press," yet article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants to copy­
right holders, through Congress, the power to prohibit the works 
of others. Copyright is intended to encourage the exercise of free­
dom of speech by enabling authors to reap maximum economic re­
turn from their works, but copyright inevitably abridges freedom of 
speech by punishing works which utilize copyrighted material in an 
unauthorized manner. There are very few cases involving the ques­
tion of copyright's peculiar relationship to the first amendment, 83 
and none dealing with the problem directly. Scholars have only re­
cently begun to explore this uncharted area. 84 
There are several ways to view the paradoxical conflict be­
tween the first amendment and copyright. One is to take the abso­
lutist view espoused by United States Supreme Court Justice Black 
and hold that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of 
speech "without any 'us' or 'buts' or 'whereas.' "85 Since copyright 
undeniably abridges freedom of speech to some degree, this strict 
construction would render all copyright laws unconstitutional. Copy­
right might also be viewed as falling within a built-in exception to 
the first amendment by virtue of the copyright clause. 86 Both of 
these views have serious flaws. Any reasonable person would admit 
that there are some forms of speech, such as perjury, fraudulent 
statements, or agreements in restraint of trade, which are not pro­
tected by the first amendment. 87 Treating copyright as a built-in 
83. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Dallas Cow­
boys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1169-71 (9th Cir. 1977); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 
303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Walt Disney Productions v. 
Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. at 108; and Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. 
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
84. See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 
983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970); Sobel, Copyright and the 
First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43 (1971); 
and Comment, supra note 47. 
85. Cohn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 
37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 553, 559 (1962). See also Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250,275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
86. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
87. See Nimmer, supra note 84, at 1182-83. 
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exception to the first amendment fails for the simple reason that 
the first amendment supersedes anything inconsistent with it in the 
main body of the Constitution. 
In light of the drawbacks of the absolutist and exception views, 
two other methods for dealing with the first amendment-copyright 
conflict may be advanced. The first, known as the "ad hoc balanc­
ing test," has been used by the United States Supreme Court to 
resolve free speech cases. 88 The second is a technique labelled the 
"definitional balancing test. "89 Courts using the ad hoc balancing 
test weigh the free speech and conflicting nonspeech interests in 
each case and determine which interest demands the greater pro­
tection. Ad hoc balancing proved to be unsatisfactory since its 
unpredictable nature failed to produce a reliable rule to guide par­
ties, and it generally had a chilling effect on free speech.90 The 
definitional balancing test has proved more satisfactory. Under that 
test, speech and nonspeech, interests are still balanced, but with a 
crucial difference: "the balancing is not for the purpose of de­
termining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case 
before the court, but rather for the purpose of determining which 
forms of speech are to be regarded as 'speech' within the meaning 
of the first amendment. "91 Definitional balancing is thus better 
able to create rules for the future guidance of those who wish to 
speak. Examples of such rules fashioned by the Supreme Court 
may be found in the obscenity,92 privacy,93 and libel94 areas. In 
New Yark Times Co. v. Sullivan,95 for instance, the Court estab­
lished standards which defamatory speech must meet in order to 
warrant protection by the first amendment. The Court thus made it 
possible for people to judge what defamatory speech is "speech" 
within the meaning of the first amendment. 
The definitional balancing test is clearly the best method for 
88. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 
1424 (1962). 
89. See Emerson, supra note 88; Frantz, supra note 88; Nimmer, The Right to 
Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and 
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 939-41 (1968). 
90. See Nimmer, supra note 84, at 1183-84. 
91. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added). 
92. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and its progeny, especially A 
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of 
Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
93. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
95. Id. See also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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resolving conflicts between the first amendment and copyright. 96 
Such a test would allow the courts to draw a line between those 
forms of speech prohibited by copyright and those forms of speech 
protected by the first amendment, even though they arguably vio­
late copyright law. Parody is a form of speech which needs the bene­
fit of reclassification under such a definitional balancing approach. 
The most effective way to resolve the conflict between parody and 
copyright is for the courts to adopt the concept of legal parody 
and then to classify legal parody as a form of free speech protected 
by the first amendment. Such an action would eliminate the unde­
sirable task of applying the fair use test to parody and would estab­
lish a definite standard to guide the parodist in the practice ofhis art. 
In the few cases addressing the conflict between the first 
amendment and copyright, there are hints that the first amend­
ment may indeed have occasion to exert more muscle against copy­
right interests. A 1966 Second Circuit case, Rosemont Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 97 contained the following dictum by 
Chief Circuit Judge Lumbard: 
The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright 
laws at least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any 
attempted interference with the public's right to be informed re­
garding matters of general interest when anyone seeks to use the 
copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of 
quite a different nature. 98 
The federal district court in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associ­
ates99 and the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. United 
96. See Nimmer, supra note 84, at 1184. 
97. 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
Rosemont involved an infringement action brought by the owner of the copyright on 
magazine articles concerning the celebrity, Howard Hughes. Look Magazine pub­
lished a series of articles on Hughes in 1954. When Hughes learned Random House 
was about to publish an unauthorized biography of him in 1966, he organized 
Rosemont Enterprises and bought the copyright to the Look articles. Rosemont then 
obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining publication of the biography on the 
ground that it infringed the copyright on the Look articles. The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, per Judge Moore, vacated the injunction after holding Random 
House's use of the Look articles fell within the boundaries of fair use. In a concur­
ring opinion, Judge Lumbard stressed that copyright laws should not be allowed to 
interfere with the public's first amendment interest in being fully informed regard­
ing matters of general concern. 
98. Id. at 31l. 
99. 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Time involved an infringement suit 
brought by the copyright owner of the Zapruder motion picture film of President 
John F. Kennedy's assassination. The defendants published a book in 1967, J. 
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States 100 both reached decisions against the copyright holder and 
the Government, respectively, in part because of a strong convic­
tion that the public has a first amendment interest in receiving as 
much information as is available regarding matters of general con­
cern.101 In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 102 the defen­
dant asked the district court to balance the competing interests of 
freedom of expression and copyright protection, but the court 
found this unnecessary in light of its determination that the 
disputed work was not parody but was mere reproduction. 103 The 
court did state, however, that "Assuming, without deciding, that 
the First Amendment does mark out some boundary for the pro­
tection that may be afforded a creator under the copyright laws, 
that boundary has not been reached here. "104 This suggests that 
the court believed free speech interests could outweigh copyright 
interests in some instances. 
The argument for the classification of legal parody as a form of 
protected free speech need not rely on such oblique intimations. 
The fundamental issue is not whether the unrestrained publication 
of all forms of free speech should take precedence over the in­
terests of copyright holders, but whether one form of free speech 
should enjoy such precedence. The specific question is whether 
parody is a form of free speech whose publication deserves to be 
protected despite the fact it may contravene traditional copyright 
THOMPSON, SIX SECONDS IN DALLAS (1967), containing illustrations that copied a 
number of parts of the Zapruder film. Time, Incorporated sued for infringement, but 
Judge Wyatt of the Southern District of New York held in favor of the defendants on 
the grounds that the book's illustrations fell within the boundaries of fair use, that 
there is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the assassina­
tion, and that the plaintiffs suffered little, if any, injury. 
100. 403 U.S. 713, 714-30 (1971). New York Times Co., more commonly known 
as "The Pentagon Papers Case," involved the attempt of the government to enjoin the 
New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classi­
fied study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." 
The government failed to obtain an injunction on the district court level, and the Su­
preme Court' affirmed the denial of injunctive relief on the ground that the govern­
ment had failed to meet the heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition 
of such a prior restraint. The concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas are 
especially concerned with the more general first amendment implications of the 
case. 
101. See Nimmer, supra note 84, at 1200; notes 99 & 100 supra. 
102. 345 F. Supp. at 108. For a brief description of the facts of Air Pirates, see 
notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 47, at 
573-76, 582-83. 
103. 345 F. Supp. at 115-16. 
104. Id. at 116. 
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interests. Pragmatic and constitutional arguments dictate that this 
question should be answered affirmatively. 
U sing a definitional balancing test, a court can weigh the in­
terests of protecting parody against the interests of maximizing copy­
right holders' financial returns. For pragmatic reasons, the scale 
tips to the side of parody. A decision favoring copyright holders' in­
terests would perpetuate the continued application of the fair use 
test to parody and also perpetuate that test's inequitable results. 
The fair use test is too subjective, and parody too complex, for the 
courts to fashion reliable standards to define the relationship be­
tween parodists and copyright holders. As will be discussed, the 
establishment of legal parody as a form of free speech whose pro­
tection takes precedence over copyright interests will clarify the re­
lationship between parodists and copyright holders and thus will 
simplify the work of the courts. 
Most important is the constitutional argument for designating 
legal parody as a form of protected free speech. The freedom to 
publish literature and criticism is an important element of free 
speech. Legal parody is a unique combination of literature and crit­
icism, and the right to publish legal parody is an element of free 
speech. The copyright holder's power to enjoin or punish the pub­
lication of parody is a form of property right. The right of free 
speech, however, enjoys a preferred position; and restrictions on 
free speech will be reviewed more closely than those on property 
rights. 105 Moreover, the primary object of article I, section 8 is to 
provide for copyright laws which "promote the Progress of Science 
and the Useful Arts." Providing for the maximum financial benefit 
of copyright holders is only a secondary consideration. 106 After ap­
plying a definitional balancing test, it is evident that free speech 
and article I, section 8 interests in publishing legal parody out­
weigh copyright holders' property right interest in enjoining such 
publication. Since parody is an exercise of free speech which pro­
motes the progress of science and the arts, the Constitution should 
prevent copyright holders from restraining the publication of legal 
105. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Also, 
free speech is "susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger 
to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
106. "[Tlhe primary consideration of the English copyright law-and of ours 
... was and is to advance the progress of arts and sciences. In giving effect to this 
objective, material gain is not ... primary, but secondary." Yankwich, supra note 3, 
at 1151. See also notes 19, 55, 58, 64 & 65 supra and accompanying text. 
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parody. Using a definitional balancing test, the courts should clas­
sify legal parody as a form of free speech protected by the first 
amendment which is immune from the copyright laws. 
It must be stressed that these arguments apply only to legal 
parody; nonlegal parody is fully subject to the fair use test and all 
other copyright laws and sanctions. Nor should these arguments 
be expanded and applied to the publication of every form of speech 
which promotes the progress of the sciences and the arts. The des­
ignation of legal parody as an exception to the copyright laws 
should not be viewed as a step toward such a slippery slope. The 
courts, however, have hardly begun to delineate the complex re­
lationship between copyright and free speech, and until future 
opinions hold to the contrary, traditional copyright interests will 
probably continue to be held superior to various free speech in­
terests. Legal parody, however, must be treated differently because 
it is a peculiar form of speech which has been victimized in the 
past and requires favored treatment to achieve equitable status. 107 
Whether the concept of legal parody will ultimately be put to use 
depends upon findings by individual judges that legal parody is 
indeed a form of free speech worthy of special protection from 
hostile copyright laws. In addition to the pragmatic and constitu­
tional reasons suggested above, such findings may be motivated 
by the judge's perception of the need to reaffirm parody's tradi­
tional value as social commentary, literary criticism, and sheer en­
tertainment. 108 
Assuming it is possible for the courts to sanction the classifica­
tion of legal parody as a protected form of free speech on the basis 
of the arguments outlined above, the courts must then implement 
this new approach. The courts can give effect to the principle of le­
gal parody by applying the same type of definitional balancing test 
that has enabled the Supreme Court to establish rules in the areas 
of obscenity, privacy, and libep09 The key to any court's applica­
tion of a definitional balancing test to parody is the concept of legal 
107. This parallel to equal protection law is of course meant to be analogical 
rather than literal. For especially illuminating discussions of evolving equal protec­
tion standards, see Gunther, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8-20 (1972); Comment, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-133 (1969). 
108. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d at 541; Elsmere Music, 
Inc., v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aiI'd, 623 F.2d 252 
(2d Cir. 1980), and notes 9 & 80 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See notes 92-94 supra. 
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parody itself. The standards for measuring whether first amend­
ment protection extends to a particular parody can be derived from 
judicial adoption and articulation of that concept. Thus, the form of 
free speech protected by the first amendment would not be parody 
in general, but only those parodies which rise to the standard of le­
gal parody. With legal parody classified as a protected form of 
speech, the crucial question for the courts to decide in any particu­
lar case is whether the disputed work satisfies the standard of legal 
parody. 
It should be recalled that a legal parody is defined as a distinct 
work that imitates in a satiric manner the ideas and expression of a 
previously published work. For a court to find that a parodist has 
written a legal parody, it must be clear that he took the previously 
published work and, through the creative use of satiric imitation 
and invention, transposed the ideas and expression of the work into 
a recognizably distinct work. Once a court determines that a 
disputed work satisnes this standard, it is then deemed a legal 
parody and, regardless of whether the artist's appropriation argu­
ably violates fair use, it is entitled to nrst amendment protection 
as free speech. 
In any application of the dennitional balancing test to the class 
of parody, there should be a rebuttable presumption that all paro­
dies are legal and thus protected as free speech. For a copyright 
holder to sue a parodist successfully for infringement, the copyright 
holder would have to carry the burden of proof and establish that 
the disputed parody is not in fact a legal parody. This would re­
quire the copyright holder to prove that the disputed work is not 
original or recognizably distinct from the copyright holder's own 
work; there must be no creative use of satiric imitation and inven­
tion which metamorphizes the ideas and expression of the serious 
work. If the copyright holder succeeds in proving this allegation, 
he has established that the disputed work is not a legal parody; 
he may then pursue the usual remedies available under the Copy­
right Act, such as dollar damages or an injunction. The customary 
fair use exception is still available to the parodist as a defense. 
An application of the legal parody concept by the courts can 
be illustrated by reconsidering the Loew's and Air Pirates cases in 
light of this new approach. The crucial question in each case be­
comes whether the disputed work satisnes the standard of legal 
parody. If so, the work must be protected; if not, it may be sub­
jected to the fair use test or other copyright infringement tests. 
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The facts must be carefully examined by the court and then com­
pared with the scope and definition of legal parody described 
above. Given the findings of fact and the description of the evi­
dence in Loew's, 110 a court using the legal parody approach would 
have to hold that Jack Benny's parody of "Gaslight" did indeed 
satisfy the standard of legal parody. Consequently, despite the ex­
istence of substantial appropriation under the fair use test, the 
parody was protected by the first amendment and was immune to a 
claim of copyright infringement. In the Air Pirates case, the court 
would have concluded that, since the appropriated Disney cartoon 
characters were not metamorphized into distinct, original creations 
through the use of satiric imitation, i.e., caricature, but were 
merely reproduced in an unusual context,111 the disputed work did 
not measure up to the standards of legal parody and thus could be 
subjected to an application of the fair use test. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from an examination of the cases involving the 
parody-infringement problem that the application of the fair use 
test is an inappropriate method for resolving the conflict between 
parody and copyright. The inconsistent and unsatisfactory results of 
the cases can be traced to the clash between the uniquely complex 
characteristics of parody and the sweeping subjectivity of the fair 
use test. The recurring conflict between parody and copyright can 
be resolved only if the courts set aside the fair use test, adopt the 
concept of legal parody, and utilize a definitional balancing test to 
establish that legal parody is a form of free speech protected by the 
first amendment. 
The use of the legal parody approach would have a positive ef­
fect on the law, the parodist, the public, and the copyright holder. 
The approach would finally clarify the relationship between parody 
and the law, and thus replace the current confused and inconsis­
tent treatment with a definite standard. Even more important, how­
ever, the legal parody approach would further the constitutional in­
terests in free speech and promotion of the arts. It would also 
establish guidelines for the parodist to use in judging the legality of 
his works, thus encouraging creation of and protection of the publi­
cation of parody. By facilitating the dissemination of legitimate 
\ 
110. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text. 

Ill. See notes 40, 46 & 47 supra and accompanying text. 
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parody, the new approach guarantees that the public will receive 
maximum exposure to the benefits of parody's criticism and enter­
tainment. For copyright holders, the approach would at last pro­
vide a reliable standard for predicting the outcome of law suits 
against parodists. 
